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Abstract
Whereas “convexification by aggregation” is a well-understood proce-
dure in mathematical economics, “convexification by randomization”
has largely been limited to theories of statistical decision-making, op-
timal control and non-cooperative games. In this paper, in the context
of classical Walrasian general equilibrium theory, we offer a compre-
hensive treatment of relaxed economies and their relaxed Walrasian
equilibria: our results pertain to a setting with a finite or a contin-
uum of agents, and a continuum of commodities modeled either as an
ordered separable Banach space or as an L∞-space. As a substan-
tive consequence, we demonstrate that the convexity hypothesis can
be removed from the original large economy under the saturation hy-
pothesis, and that existing results in the antecedent literature can be
effortlessly recovered.
Keywords: Relaxed large economy; Walrasian equilibrium; Saturated mea-
sure space; Lyapunov convexity theorem; Purification principle; Relaxed con-
trol.
JEL classification: C62, D41, D51.
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1 Introduction
Large economies were introduced by Aumann (1966) as a prototype of perfect
competition, and he demonstrated the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium
in the setting of a finite-dimensional commodity space and a continuum of
agents modeled as a nonatomic finite measure space. In his theorem, Au-
mann dispensed with the assumption of convexity of preferences: an insight
rather remarkable for its time. Since then, there have been several attempts
to extend the theorem to a setting with an infinite-dimensional commodity
space, and they have all stumbled on the well-known failure of the Lyapunov
convexity theorem in infinite dimensions, and thereby failed to subdue the
possible nonconvexity of the aggregate demand set. This is the reason why
convexity assumptions on preferences are pervasive and inevitable even under
the nonatomicity hypothesis on the set of agents, as in Khan and Yannelis
(1991); Noguchi (1997) for ordered separable Banach spaces, and in Bewley
(1991) for l∞. This has led to efforts to strengthen the hypothesis along the
intuition that there be “many more agents than commodities”: in addition
to Martins-da-Rocha (2003); Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), see Podczeck
(1997) for its formalization of the intuition as a condition on the nonatomic
disintegration of the population measure of agents.
However, recent work has established the validity of the Lyapunov con-
vexity theorem, and as its corollary, the convexity property of the integral of
a multifunction, under the reasonable assumption that the underlying mea-
sure space of agents is a saturated space. Both separable Banach spaces and
the dual of separable Banach spaces have been considered, and indeed, this
saturation property has been shown to be both necessary and sufficient for
the results; see Khan and Sagara (2013, 2015, 2016); Podczeck (2008); Sun
and Yannelis (2008). It is thus natural then that one looks for a general-
ization of Aumann’s theorem under the assumption of a saturated measure
space of agents by exploiting the (exact) convexity of the aggregate demand
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set in the setting of an infinite-dimensional commodity space even when the
individual demand sets are not convex. Such a result has now been satisfac-
torily executed by Lee (2013), and he also handles the difficulty arising from
the failure of the joint continuity of the valuation functional.1 However, it
bears emphasis that the result in Lee (2013) does not apply to economies
with a finite set of agents, but only to those with a continuum.2
In this paper, we take an approach alternative to “convexification by ag-
gregation”, by drawing on “convexification by randomization”, a completely
different operation from aggregation, and one that is also valid for economies
with a finite set of agents. This procedure, and its terminology of “relaxed
controls”, is well-established in optimal control theory, and explored in, by
now classical, work of McShane (1967); Warga (1972); Young (1969). To
be sure, this is not an altogether novel direction, and it has been pursued
with varying emphases in Prescott and Townsend (1984), Nowak (1992), and
Balder (2008).3 This work takes up the notion of “relaxation” of the relevant
solution concept by focusing on a randomized choice by the optimizing agent.
As specifically illustrated in Prescott and Townsend (1984), this randomiza-
tion device is recognized to be more or less artificial, but that it copes with the
nonconvex constraints which stem from idiosyncratic shocks to each agent.4
In this paper, our sole concern is Walrasian general equilibrium theory, and
more specifically, on Aumann’s theorem with non-convex preferences, and we
incorporate the refinements of the relaxation technique as offered in Sagara
(2016).
1As is by now well-known and well-understood, this was the third mathematical dif-
ficulty emphasized by Bewley (1991, pp. 224–225) when “there are both infinitely many
commodities and infinitely many participants in an economy.” The other two difficulties
that were identified concerned the facts that (i) “there does not exist an infinite dimen-
sional version of Fatou’s lemma”, and that (ii) “budget sets in L∞ are not typically norm
bounded and hence weak-star compact, even when they are defined by price systems in
L
1.” For a comprehensive discussion of these issues in the context of economies with a
finite set of agents, as well as additional difficulties arising from the non-emptiness of the
interior of the positive cone of a commodity space, see Mas-Colell and Zame (1991).
2To be precise, the result applies to economies with atoms only under the convexity
hypothesis on their preferences.
3Prescott and Townsend (1984) have incentive compatibility in economies with a finite
set of agents as their basic thrust; Nowak (1992) is concerned with correlated equilibria;
and Balder (2008) is after a synthesis of the Nash mixed-strategy theorem in games with
a continuum of agents and of general equilibrium theory with externalities and price-
dependent preferences. He assumes, as he must, the hypotheses of convexity or single-
valuedness of individual demands; but see Footnote 8 below.
4Contrary to Cass and Shell (1983), randomness under consideration is different from
extrinsic uncertainty that is unrelated to preferences and endowments of an economy,
which results in state-dependent equilibria under the convexity hypothesis.
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The procedure for the relaxation of economies that is pursued in this
paper is as follows.
• The preferences of each agent possesses a utility representation on a
common consumption set X formalized as a Polish subset of a Banach
space.
• Utility functions on X are then extended to the set Π(X) of probability
measures onX , and are thereby an affine extension on Π(X). Extended
preferences on Π(X) are consistent with the expected utility hypothesis.
• Each probability measure in Π(X) is regarded as a randomized com-
modity (a lottery) over X . Given a market price, each agent can pur-
chase the barycenter of a probability measure, which is a convex com-
bination of commodities in X with respect to a probability measure in
Π(X) under the budget constraint.
• Barycentric commodities under the budget constraint, so to speak, are
evaluated in terms of expected utilities and constitute the relaxed de-
mand set of each agent. It is thereby defined as a closed convex subset
of Π(X).5
• Relaxed allocations are well-defined in a way that the aggregate of
the barycentric commodities of each agent does not exceed the total
endowment. Relaxed Walrasian equilibria for relaxed economies are
thereby formulated in a consistent manner.
• Dirac measures in Π(X) reduce to the usual notion of a commodity in
X, and consequently, Walrasian equilibria for the original economy are
identified with relaxed (purified) Walrasian equilibria for the relaxed
economy.
We then offer for classical Walrasian general equilibrium theory a sup-
plementation to the usual convexification method: under the saturation hy-
pothesis, we can always construct a Walrasian equilibrium for the original
economy from a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for the relaxed economy. The
point is that the existence of the latter is easily established on account of the
fact that the relaxed economy is already a convexification of the original econ-
omy. This is done through a “purification principle”, as in Khan and Sagara
(2014); Sagara (2016), a powerful tool whose utility in non-cooperative game
theory and statistical decision theory is well-understood. As to the difficulty
5Since the preferences of each agent are not assumed to be convex, it should be noted
that the individual demand set for the original economy lacks convexity.
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of the joint continuity of the valuation functional for price-commodity pairs in
infinite dimensions when one attempts to apply the fixed point theorem,6 we
adapt the technique employed in Lee (2013); Podczeck (1997) to relaxed de-
mand sets. In short summary, we can remove the convexity hypothesis from
Khan and Yannelis (1991), and recover the existence result in Lee (2013);
Podczeck (1997); Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) under the saturation hy-
pothesis, all in the context of a separable Banach space. Furthermore, in
L∞-spaces, we can also remove the convexity hypothesis from Bewley (1991)
and derive the existence of Walrasian equilibria with free disposal under the
saturation hypothesis.
As applications, we offer two examples. We illustrate how our existence
result yields the existence of Pareto optimal, envy-free allocations in large
economies with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces; this sharpens the
classical result of Varian (1974). Curiously, envy-freeness is naturally in-
terpreted as incentive compatibility in random economies where each agent
incurs an idiosyncratic shock that characterizes his/her type along the lines
of Prescott and Townsend (1984). We also demonstrate that our existence
result is valid for economies with indivisible commodities along the lines of
Khan and Yamazaki (1981); this presents an alternative approach to the
existence result on economies with indivisible commodities investigated in
Danilov et al. (2001) and Svensson (1984) via the alternative convexification
technique.
2 Preliminaries
We develop four ideas in three subsections,: relaxed controls in optimal con-
trol theory, the purification principle now also pervasive in application to the
theory of non-atomic games, the saturation property and Gelfand integra-
tion of functions taking values in the space of essentially bounded measurable
functions.
6We note the use of the infinite-dimensional version of the Gale–Nikaido lemma and
Michael’s selection theorem in Yannelis (1985). We also note that this difficulty of joint
continuity of the valuation functional does not arise when one is working in a finite-
dimensional space. Thus, in Balder (2008), even though the commodity space of probabil-
ity measures on the finite-dimensional commodity space is infinite dimensional, the valua-
tion functional is jointly continuous by virtue of the price space being a finite-dimensional
Euclidean space.
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2.1 Relaxed Controls
We denote by Π(X) the set of probability measures on a Polish space X
furnished with the Borel σ-algebra Borel(X). We endow Π(X) with the
topology of weak convergence of probability measures, which is the coarsest
topology on Π(X) for which the integral functional P 7→
∫
vdP on Π(X) is
continuous for every bounded continuous function v : X → R. Then Π(X)
is also a Polish space; see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 15.15).
Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space. (Throughout the paper, we always
assume that it is complete.) ByM(T,X) we denote the space of measurable
functions from T to X and by R(T,X) the space of measurable functions
from T to Π(X). Each element in M(T,X) is called a control and that in
R(T,X) is called a relaxed control (a Young measure, a stochastic kernel,
or a transition probability), which is a probability measure-valued control.
For every function λ : T → Π(X), the real-valued function t 7→ λ(t)(C)
is measurable for every C ∈ Borel(X) if and only if λ is measurable; see
Podczeck (2009, Lemma 2). By ∆(X), we denote the set of Dirac measures
on X , i.e., δx ∈ ∆(X) whenever for every C ∈ Borel(X): δx(C) = 1 if x ∈ C
and δx(C) = 0 otherwise. Each control f ∈ M(T,X) is identified with the
Dirac measure valued control δf(·) ∈ R(T,X) satisfying δf(t) ∈ ∆(X) for
every t ∈ T .
A real-valued function u : T × X → R is a Carathe´odory function if
t 7→ u(t, x) is measurable for every x ∈ X and x 7→ u(t, x) is continuous
for every t ∈ T . The Carathe´odory function u is jointly measurable; see
Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 4.51). A Carathe´odory function u is
integrably bounded if there exists ϕ ∈ L1(µ) such that |u(t, x)| ≤ ϕ(t) for
every (t, x) ∈ T×X . Denote by C1(T×X, µ) the space of integrably bounded
Carathe´odory functions on T × X . For each u ∈ C1(T × X, µ), define the
integral functional Iu : R(T,X) → R by Iu(λ) =
∫∫
u(t, x)λ(t, dx)dµ. The
weak topology on R(T,X) is defined as the coarsest topology for which every
integral functionals Iu is continuous for every u ∈ C1(T × X, µ). If T is a
singleton, then the set R(T,X) coincides with the set Π(X). In this case
C1(T×X, µ) coincides with the space Cb(X) of bounded continuous functions
on X and the weak topology of R(T,X) is the topology of weak convergence
of probability measures in Π(X). Denote by K
w
the weak closure of K ⊂
R(T,X).
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2.2 The Purification Principle in Saturated Measure
Spaces
A finite measure space (T,Σ, µ) is said to be essentially countably generated
if its σ-algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets together
with the null sets; (T,Σ, µ) is said to be essentially uncountably generated
whenever it is not essentially countably generated. Let ΣS = {A ∩ S |
A ∈ Σ} be the σ-algebra restricted to S ∈ Σ. Denote by L1S(µ) the space
of µ-integrable functions on the measurable space (S,ΣS) whose element is
identified with a restriction of a function in L1(µ) to S. An equivalence
relation ∼ on ΣS is given by A ∼ B ⇔ µ(A△B) = 0, where A△B is the
symmetric difference of A and B in Σ. The collection of equivalence classes
is denoted by Σ(µ) = Σ/ ∼ and its generic element Â is the equivalence
class of A ∈ Σ. We define the metric ρ on Σ(µ) by ρ(Â, B̂) = µ(A△B).
Then (Σ(µ), ρ) is a complete metric space (see Aliprantis and Border (2006,
Lemma 13.13) or Dunford and Schwartz (1958, Lemma III.7.1)) and (Σ(µ), ρ)
is separable if and only if L1(µ) is separable (see Aliprantis and Border (2006,
Lemma 13.14)). The density of (Σ(µ), ρ) is the smallest cardinal number of
the form |U|, where U is a dense subset of Σ(µ).
Definition 2.1. A finite measure space (T,Σ, µ) is saturated if L1S(µ) is
nonseparable for every S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0. We say that a finite measure
space has the saturation property if it is saturated.
Saturation implies nonatomicity and several equivalent definitions for sat-
uration are known; see Fajardo and Keisler (2002); Fremlin (2012); Hoover
and Keisler (1984); Keisler and Sun (2009). One of the simple characteriza-
tions of the saturation property is as follows. A finite measure space (T,Σ, µ)
is saturated if and only if (S,ΣS, µ) is essentially uncountably generated for
every S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0. The saturation of finite measure spaces is also
synonymous with the uncountability of the density of ΣS(µ) for every S ∈ Σ
with µ(S) > 0; see Fremlin (2012, 331Y(e)). An germinal notion of satura-
tion already appeared in Kakutani (1944); Maharam (1942). The significance
of the saturation property lies in the fact that it is necessary and sufficient
for the weak compactness and the convexity of the Bochner integral of a
multifunction as well as the Lyapunov convexity theorem in Banach spaces;
see Khan and Sagara (2013, 2015, 2016); Podczeck (2008); Sun and Yannelis
(2008).
Let E be a Banach space and L1(µ,E) be the space of Bochner integrable
functions from T to E. We say that a function Φ : T ×X → E is integrably
bounded if there exists ϕ ∈ L1(µ) such that ‖Φ(t, x)‖ ≤ ϕ(t) for every (t, x) ∈
T ×X . Hence, Φ(·, x) ∈ L1(µ,E) for every x ∈ X whenever Φ is integrably
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bounded and measurable, and E is separable. Except for Subsections 2.3
and 3.5, and Section B, the integration of E-valued functions with respect to
the finite measure µ and probability measures in Π(X) is always supposed
to be in the Bochner sense.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Khan and Sagara
(2014, Theorem 5.1), whose proof hinges on the Lyapunov convexity theorem
in separable Banach spaces obtained in Khan and Sagara (2013) under the
saturation hypothesis.
Proposition 2.1 (purification principle). Let (T,Σ, µ) be a saturated finite
measure space, E be a separable Banach space, and X be a compact Polish
space. If Φ : T ×X → E is an integrably bounded measurable function such
that Φ(t, ·) : X → E is continuous in the weak topology of E for every t ∈ T
and U : T ։ X is a multifunction with gphU ∈ Σ ⊗ Borel(X), then for
every λ ∈ R(T,X) with λ(t)(U(t)) = 1 a.e. t ∈ T , there exists f ∈M(T,X)
with f(t) ∈ U(t) a.e. t ∈ T such that∫
T
∫
X
Φ(t, x)λ(t, dx)dµ =
∫
T
Φ(t, f(t))dµ.
A control-theoretic interpretation of Proposition 2.1 means that any “re-
laxed” control system t 7→ Φˆ(t, λ(t)) :=
∫
Φ(t, x)λ(t, dx) operated by λ ∈
R(T,X) consistent with the control set U(t) is realized by adopting a “pu-
rified” control system t 7→ Φ(t, f(t)) operated by f ∈ M(T,X) with the
feasibility constraint f(t) ∈ U(t) in such a way that its Bochner integral
over T is preserved with
∫
Φˆ(t, λ(t))dµ =
∫
Φ(t, f(t))dµ. An application of
Proposition 2.1 to nonconvex variational problems with infinite-dimensional
control systems is explored in Khan and Sagara (2014).
Remark 2.1. For the case with E = Rn, Proposition 2.1 holds under the
nonatomicity hypothesis, which is a well-known result in control theory at-
tributed to Warga (1972, Theorem IV.3.14); see also Arkin and Levin (1972,
Theorem 2.5). In particular, when X is a finite or countably infinite set,
Warga’s result corresponds to the classical result of Dvoretsky, Wald and
Wolfowitz (1951); see also Khan and Rath (2009); Khan et al. (2006). The
case for E = RN with X a compact Polish space is covered in Loeb and
Sun (2006, Theorem 2.2), Loeb and Sun (2009, Theorem 2.2), and Podczeck
(2009, Theorem 2) under the saturation hypothesis. As well as applications
in optimal control theory along the lines of Arkin and Levin (1972); Balder
(1984); Berliocchi and Lasry (1973); Khan and Sagara (2014); Sagara (2016);
Sainte-Beuve (1978); Warga (1972), the purification principle of this type
also justifies the elimination of randomness in statistical decision theory as
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in Balder (1985); Dvoretsky et al. (1951); Feinberg and Piunovskiy (2006);
Gonza´lez-Herna´ndez and Herna´ndez-Lerma (2005), and the purification of
mixed strategies for games with incomplete information with finite players,
as in Askoura et al. (2013); Khan and Rath (2009); Khan et al. (2006); Loeb
and Sun (2006); Milgrom and Weber (1985); Noguchi (2014); Radner and
Rosenthal (1982).
2.3 Gelfand Integrals in L∞
Let (Ω,F , ν) be a σ-finite measure space. A function f : T → L∞(ν) is
weakly∗ scalarly measurable if the scalar function 〈ϕ, f(·)〉 on T is measurable
for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν), where the duality between L1(ν) and L∞(ν) is given by
〈ϕ, ψ〉 =
∫
ϕψdν for ϕ ∈ L1(ν) and ψ ∈ L∞(ν). We say that weakly∗ scalarly
measurable functions f and g are weakly∗ scalarly equivalent if 〈ϕ, f(t) −
g(t)〉 = 0 for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν) a.e. t ∈ T (the exceptional µ-null set depending
on ϕ). We say that a weakly∗ scalarly measurable function f : T → L∞(ν) is
weakly∗ scalarly integrable if the scalar function 〈ϕ, f(·)〉 is integrable for every
ϕ ∈ L1(ν). A weakly∗ scalarly measurable function f is Gelfand integrable
over A ∈ Σ if there exists ψA ∈ L∞(ν) such that 〈ϕ, ψA〉 =
∫
A
〈ϕ, f(t)〉dµ
for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν). The element ψA is called the Gelfand integral (or the
weak∗ integral) of f over A and denoted by
∫
A
fdµ. Every weakly∗ scalarly
integrable function is weakly∗ integrable; see Aliprantis and Border (2006,
Theorem 11.52). Denote by G1(µ, L∞(ν)) the equivalence classes of Gelfand
integrable functions with respect to weakly∗ scalarly equivalence.
Equipped with the notion of Gelfand integration, we turn to the de-
velopment of a straightforward variant of Proposition 2.1. It is a special
case of Sagara (2016, Theorem 3.3) to a setting where the integration of
L∞(ν)-valued functions with respect to the finite measure µ and probability
measures in Π(X) is always supposed to be in the sense of a Gelfand integral.
Proposition 2.2 (purification principle in L∞). Proposition 2.1 is valid in
the sense of Gelfand integrals when the separable Banach space E is replaced
by L∞(ν) endowed with the weak∗-topology, where (Ω,F , ν) is a countably
generated σ-finite measure space.
3 Relaxed Large Economies
3.1 Relaxation of Large Economies
The set of agents is given by a complete finite measure space (T,Σ, µ). The
commodity space is given by a separable Banach space E. The preference
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relation %(t) of each agent t ∈ T is a complete, transitive binary relation
on a common consumption set X ⊂ E, which induces the preference map
t 7→ %(t) ⊂ X × X . We denote by x%(t) y the relation (x, y) ∈ %(t).
The indifference and strict relations are defined respectively by x∼(t) y ⇔
x%(t) y and y%(t) x, and by x≻(t) y ⇔ x%(t) y and x 6∼(t) y. Each agent
possesses an initial endowment ω(t) ∈ X , which is the value of a Bochner
integrable function ω : T → E. The economy E consists of the primitives
E = {(T,Σ, µ), X,%, ω}.
The standing assumption on E is described as follows.
Assumption 3.1. (i) X is a weakly compact subset of E.
(ii) %(t) is a weakly closed subset of X ×X for every t ∈ T .
(iii) For every x, y ∈ X the set {t ∈ T | x%(t) y} is in Σ.
The weak compactness assumption in condition (i) is made in Khan and
Yannelis (1991); Lee (2013); Martins-da-Rocha (2003); Noguchi (1997); Pod-
czeck (1997); Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) for the uncommon consumption
set of each agent. Since E is separable, the weakly compact set X ⊂ E is
metrizable for the weak topology (see Dunford and Schwartz (1958, Theo-
rem V.6.3)), and hence, the common consumption set X is a compact Polish
space. The preference relation %(t) is said to be continuous if it satisfies
condition (ii). The measurability of the preference mapping in condition (iii)
is introduced in Aumann (1969).
It follows from Aumann (1969, Proposition 1) that there exists a Carathe´odory
function u : T ×X → R such that7
∀x, y ∈ X ∀t ∈ T : x%(t) y ⇐⇒ u(t, x) ≥ u(t, y). (3.1)
Moreover, this representation in terms of Carathe´odory functions is unique
up to strictly increasing, continuous transformations in the following sense:
If F : T × R→ R is a function such that t 7→ F (t, r) is measurable and r 7→
F (t, r) is strictly increasing and continuous, then x%(t) y ⇔ F (t, u(t, x)) ≥
F (t, u(t, y)), where (t, x) 7→ F (t, u(t, x)) is a Carathe´odory function. In the
sequel, we may assume without loss of generality that the preference map
t 7→ %(t) is represented by a Carathe´odory function u that is unique up to
strictly increasing, continuous transformations.
Following Sagara (2016), we introduce the notion of “relaxation” of pref-
erences for large economies. Given a continuous preference %(t) on X , its
7While Aumann (1969) treated the case where X is the nonnegative orthant of a finite-
dimensional Euclidean space, the proof is obviously valid as it stands for the case where
X is a separable metric space.
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continuous affine extension %R(t) to Π(X) is obtained by convexifying (ran-
domizing) the individual utility function u(t, ·) in such a way
∀P,Q ∈ Π(X) ∀t ∈ T : P %R(t)Q
def
⇐⇒
∫
X
u(t, x)dP ≥
∫
X
u(t, x)dQ. (3.2)
The continuous extension %R(t) of %(t) from X to the relaxed consump-
tion set Π(X) is called a relaxed preference relation on Π(X). Thus, the
restriction of %R(t) to ∆(X) coincides with %(t) on X . Indifference relation
∼R(t) and strict relation ≻R(t) are defined in a way analogous to the above.
The extension formula (3.2) conforms to the relaxation technique explored in
McShane (1967); Warga (1972); Young (1969). It is noteworthy that relaxed
preferences also conform to the “expected utility hypothesis” and the contin-
uous function u(t, ·) corresponds to the “von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function” for %R(t). That is, %R(t) is a continuous preference relation on
Π(X) satisfying the “independence axiom” introduced in von Neumann and
Mogenstern (1953).
(Independence) For every P,Q,R ∈ Π(X) and α ∈ [0, 1]: P ∼R(t)Q im-
plies αP + (1− α)R∼R(t)αQ+ (1− α)R.
Conversely, for every t ∈ T any continuous binary relation on Π(X) satisfy-
ing the independence axiom is representable in terms of the continuous von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function u(t, ·) for which (3.2) is satisfied; see
Grandmont (1972, Theorem 3). Furthermore, this representation is unique
up to positive affine transformations.
Denote by ER = {(T,Σ, µ),Π(X),%R, δω(·)} the relaxed economy induced
by the original economy E = {(T,Σ, µ), X,%, ω}, where the initial endow-
ment ω(t) ∈ X of each agent is identified with a Dirac measure δω(t) ∈ ∆(X),
and hence, δω(·) ∈ R(T,X).
3.2 Relaxed Demand Sets
Given a price p ∈ E∗ \ {0}, for each agent t ∈ T , as usual we define the
budget set by B(t, p) = {x ∈ X | 〈p, x〉 ≤ 〈p, ω(t)〉} and the demand set by
D(t, p) = {x ∈ X | x%(t) y ∀y ∈ B(t, p)}. Let ıX be the identity map on X .
Similarly, the relaxed budget set of each agent is defined by
BR(t, p) =
{
P ∈ Π(X) |
∫
X
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP ≤ 〈p, ω(t)〉
}
and the relaxed demand set is given by
DR(t, p) = {P ∈ BR(t, p) | P %R(t)Q ∀Q ∈ BR(t, p)}.
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We denote by
∫
ıXdP the Bochner integral of ıX with respect to the prob-
ability measure P ∈ Π(X). Since
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP = 〈p,
∫
ıXdP 〉 in view of
the Bochner integrability of ıX , the “barycentric commodity”
∫
ıXdP of
P ∈ BR(t, p) is in X whenever X is convex (which we do not assume), and
affordable under the relaxed budget constraint, and the relaxed commodity
P is evaluated in terms of the expected utility represented in (3.2).
A remarkable, but natural connection between the market behavior of
each agent in the original economy and that in the relaxed economy is that
the maximization of expected utility subject to the relaxed budget constraint
is “consistent” with the deterministic utility maximization subject to the
budget constraint. Specifically, we have the following characterization on the
relaxed demand set.
Proposition 3.1. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and E be a separable
Banach space. Suppose that the economy E satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then
for every p ∈ E∗ \{0} and t ∈ T : P ∈ DR(t, p) if and only if P (D(t, p)) = 1.
3.3 Relaxed Walrasian Equilibria
To deal with the equilibrium concept with or without free disposal simulta-
neously, following Mordukhovich (2006, Chapter 8), we introduce “market
constraints” for the definition of (relaxed) allocations.
Definition 3.1. Let C be a nonempty subset of E.
(i) An element f ∈ L1(µ,E) is an allocation for E if it satisfies:∫
T
f(t)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ ∈ C and f(t) ∈ X a.e. t ∈ T .
(ii) An element λ ∈ R(T,X) is a relaxed allocation for ER if it satisfies:∫
T
∫
X
ıX(x)λ(t, dx)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ ∈ C.
In particular, when C = {0}, the definition reduces to the (relaxed)
allocations “without” free disposal ; when −C is a convex cone and E is
endowed with the cone order≤ defined by x ≤ y ⇔ y−x ∈ −C, the definition
reduces to the (relaxed) allocations “with” free disposal. Denote by A(E) the
set of allocations for E and by A(ER) the set of relaxed allocations for ER.
If λ is a relaxed allocation for ER such that λ(t) = δf(t) ∈ ∆(X) for every
t ∈ T and f ∈ L1(µ,E), then it reduces to the usual feasibility constraint∫
fdµ−
∫
ωdµ ∈ C for E . This means that A(E) ⊂ A(ER).
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Definition 3.2. (i) A price-allocation pair (p, f) ∈ (E∗ \ {0})×A(E) is a
Walrasian equilibrium for E if a.e. t ∈ T : f(t) ∈ B(t, p) and f(t)%(t) x
for every x ∈ B(t, p).
(ii) A price-relaxed allocation pair (p, λ) ∈ (E∗ \ {0}) × A(ER) is a re-
laxed Walrasian equilibrium for ER if a.e. t ∈ T : λ(t) ∈ BR(t, p) and
λ(t)%R(t)P for every P ∈ BR(t, p).
Denote by W(E) the set of Walrasian allocations for E and by W(ER) the
set of relaxed Walrasian allocations for ER.
Any Walrasian equilibrium for the original economy is regarded as a “pu-
rified” relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for the relaxed economy. Under the
saturation hypothesis, the converse result holds as well. That is, any relaxed
Walrasian equilibrium for the relaxed economy can be purified as a Walrasian
equilibrium for the original economy.
Proposition 3.2. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and E be a sepa-
rable Banach space. Suppose that the economy E satisfies Assumption 3.1.
If (p, f) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E , then (p, δf(·)) is a relaxed Wal-
rasian equilibrium for ER. Conversely, if (p, λ) is a relaxed Walrasian equi-
librium for ER, then there exists a Walrasian equilibrium (p, f) for E such
that λ(t)∼R(t) δf(t) a.e. t ∈ T whenever (T,Σ, µ) is saturated.
Another significant aspect on saturation is the density property of allo-
cations and Walrasian allocations.
Proposition 3.3 (density property). Let (T,Σ, µ) be a saturated finite mea-
sure space and E be a separable Banach space. Suppose that the economy E
satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then A(ER) = A(E)
w
and W(ER) =W(E)
w
.
Remark 3.1. It is Warga (1972, Theorem IV.2.6) who established the den-
sity theorem R(T,X) = M(T,X)
w
for compact polish spaces under the
nonatomicity hypothesis. As noted in Khan and Sagara (2014, Remark 6.1),
Proposition 3.3 holds under the nonatomicity hypothesis whenever E = Rn,
in which case the classical Lyapunov convexity theorem is sufficient for the
density property. For another variant of the density property with the
finite-dimensional setting, see, e.g., Balder (1984, Corollary 3), Berliocchi
and Lasry (1973, Proposition II.7), and Sainte-Beuve (1978, Theorem 7 and
Corollary 4).
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3.4 Existence of Walrasian Equilibria with Free Dis-
posal
For a substantive validation of the equivalence in Proposition 3.2, it suf-
fices to demonstrate the existence of relaxed Walrasian equilibria for the
relaxed economy ER instead of Walrasian equilibria for the original econ-
omy E . Following Khan and Yannelis (1991); Lee (2013); Martins-da-Rocha
(2003); Noguchi (1997); Podczeck (1997); Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), we
consider (relaxed) Walrasian equilibria with free disposal in which the com-
modity space E is an ordered separable Banach space such that the norm
interior of the positive cone E+ is nonempty. Denote by E
∗
+ be the set of
elements x∗ ∈ E∗ with 〈x∗, x〉 ≥ 0 for every x ∈ E+. An element in E∗+ \ {0}
is said to be positive. A maximal element in X for %(t) is called a satiation
point for %(t). Under Assumption 3.1, satiation points for %(t) exist for
every t ∈ T .
Assumption 3.2. (i) X is a weakly compact subset of E+.
(ii) For every t ∈ T there exists z(t) ∈ X such that ω(t)− z(t) belongs to
the norm interior of E+.
(iii) If x ∈ X is a satiation point for %(t), then x ≥ ω(t).
(iv) If x ∈ X is not a satiation point for %(t), then x belongs to the weak
closure of the upper contour set {y ∈ X | y≻(t) x}.
Condition (ii) is due to Khan and Yannelis (1991), which guarantees that for
every positive price the value of the initial endowment of each agent is strictly
positive. Condition (iii) is introduced in Podczeck (1997) and imposed also
in Lee (2013). Condition (iv) is a variant of “local nonsatiation” originated
in Hildenbrand (1968) and is imposed also in Lee (2013); Podczeck (1997).
We now present the first substantive result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and E be an ordered
separable Banach space such that the norm interior of E+ is nonempty. Then
for every economy E satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2:
(i) There exists a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for ER
with a positive price.
(ii) There exists a Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for E with a
positive price whenever (T,Σ, µ) is saturated.
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A sharp contrast to the literature on large economies, such as Aumann
(1966); Hildenbrand (1974); Khan and Yannelis (1991); Lee (2013); Martins-
da-Rocha (2003); Noguchi (1997); Podczeck (1997); Rustichini and Yannelis
(1991), is that the saturation (or even the nonatomicity) hypothesis is un-
necessary to guarantee the existence of relaxed Walrasian equilibria for the
relaxed economies as well as the convexity hypothesis. Thus, whenever the
set T of agents is finite and µ is a counting measure, the first assertion of
Theorem 3.1 reduces to the existence of relaxed Walrasian equilibria for a
relaxed finite economies without convexity assumptions. This means that re-
laxed Walrasian equilibria always exist even though the original economy fails
to possess Walrasian equilibria. Since the vernacular of “relaxed” economies
and “relaxed” Walrasian equilibria is also used in Balder (2008), we invite the
reader to compare Theorem 3.1 with the relevant result in Balder (2008).8
Given Proposition 3.2, the second assertion of Theorem 3.1 simply drops
the convexity hypothesis from Khan and Yannelis (1991) under the saturation
hypothesis and recovers the existence result of Lee (2013); Podczeck (1997);
Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) under the framework of economies with a
common consumption set. Indeed, when E is a finite-dimensional Euclidean
space, the validity of the second assertion of Theorem 3.1 for nonatomic
finite measure space of agents follows from Proposition 2.1; see Remark 2.1.
Therefore, to repeat, if (T,Σ, µ) is a nonatomic finite measure space and
E = Rn, the existence of Walrasian equilibria with free disposal for E with
a positive price is guaranteed under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. On the other
hand, when X is a finite subset of E+, the conditions on (non)satiation points
for %(t) are unnecessary for the existence result and Assumption 3.2 can be
replaced by the following.
Assumption 3.3. (i) X is a finite subset of E+.
(ii) For every t ∈ T there exists z(t) ∈ X such that ω(t)− z(t) belongs to
the norm interior of E+.
This allows us to present the second substantive result of the paper.
Theorem 3.2. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and E be an ordered
separable Banach space such that the norm interior of E+ is nonempty. Then
for every economy E satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3:
8Indeed, Balder (2008) has the priority for the usage of this terminology in mathemat-
ical economics, but as mentioned in Footnote 3, rather than classical Walrasian general
equilibrium theory, his concern is with a synthetic treatment that allows externalities and
price-dependent preferences with a finite-dimensional commodity space.
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(i) There exists a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for ER
with a positive price.
(ii) There exists a Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for E with a
positive price whenever (T,Σ, µ) is saturated.
We now conclude this subsection with two applications.
Example 3.1 (envy-freeness/incentive compatibility). An allocation f ∈
A(E) is said to be envy-free if f(t)%(t) f(t′) for a.e. t, t′ ∈ T . Let ω¯(t) =∫
ωdµ/µ(T ) and assume that ω¯(t) ∈ X for every t ∈ T . If Assumptions
3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied for the economy E = {(T,Σ, µ),%, X, ω¯} with the
same initial endowment among agents, then Theorem 3.1 guarantees that E
possesses a Walrasian equilibrium that is also Pareto optimal and envy-free;
see Varian (1974). When T is regarded as the set of random shocks drawn
from the probability measure µ, where each element t ∈ T is an idiosyn-
cratic shock that characterizes the type of agent, the envy-free condition is
reduced to the “truth revelation principle”, i.e., the “incentive compatibility”
condition studied in Prescott and Townsend (1984). This reduces to, and im-
plies, the existence of Walrasian equilibria with incentive compatibility for
economies with private information under the saturation hypothesis.
Example 3.2 (indivisible commodities). Suppose that there are n indivisi-
ble commodities each of which can be consumed in integer units and that the
common consumption set of such commodities is finite for all agents. The
resulting economy E with indivisible commodities is described in our frame-
work as follows. Let Z+ be the set of nonnegative integers, E the Euclidean
space Rn with the Euclid norm, and X a finite subset of Zn+. Let %(t) be
a preference on X represented by a Carathe´odory function u : T ×X → R.
Assume further that the endowment function ω : T → Rn is integrable such
that ω(t) belongs to X and each of its coordinates is a positive integer for
every t ∈ T . Then Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 are automatically satisfied, and
Theorem 3.2 then guarantees that there exists a relaxed Walrasian equilib-
rium with free disposal for the relaxed economy ER with a positive price. In
particular, if (T,Σ, µ) is nonatomic, then there exists a Walrasian equilib-
rium with free disposal for E with a positive price. The crucial difference of
this consequence from the existence result in Khan and Yamazaki (1981) is
that it dispenses with the introduction of divisible commodities and with the
local nonsatiation of preferences, though at the cost of the finiteness of the
consumption set.
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3.5 Existence of Walrasian Equilibria on L∞
In this subsection, we turn to economies that are modeled with L∞ as a
commodity. This extension is important for both substantive and techni-
cal reasons: substantively because it, and its dual, was identified by Bewley
(1972) as the canonical space for Walrasian general equilibrium theory; tech-
nically because it leads to to shift the emphasis of analysis to the predual
L1 rather than the dual, and thereby from Bochner integration to Gelfand
integration.
Towards this end, let (Ω,F , ν) be a countably generated, σ-finite measure
space. The norm dual of L∞(ν) is ba(ν), the space of finitely additive signed
measures on F of bounded variation that vanishes on ν-null sets with the
duality given by 〈pi, ψ〉 =
∫
ψdpi for pi ∈ ba(ν) and ψ ∈ L∞(ν); see Dunford
and Schwartz (1958, Theorem IV.8.14). We consider a (Gelfand) economy
EG = {(T,Σ, µ), X,%, ω} for which the commodity space is L∞(ν) and the
price space is ba(ν) with ω ∈ G1(µ, L∞(ν)) and ω(t) ∈ X for every t ∈ T
satisfying the following conditions.
Assumption 3.4. (i) X is a weakly∗ compact subset of L∞(ν).
(ii) %(t) is a weakly∗ closed subset of X ×X for every t ∈ T .
(iii) For every x, y ∈ X the set {t ∈ T | x%(t) y} is in Σ.
Since L1(ν) is separable, the weak∗ compact set X ⊂ L∞+ (ν) is metrizable
for the weak∗ topology of L∞(ν) (see Dunford and Schwartz (1958, Theo-
rem V.5.1)), and hence, the common consumption set X is a compact Pol-
ish space. Therefore, the preference representation in (3.1) is valid for EG.
Consequently, the preference representation (3.2) is also valid for its relaxed
economy EGR = {(T,Σ, µ),Π(X),%R, ω}.
Next, we develop the analogue for Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a nonempty subset of L∞(ν).
(i) An element f ∈ G1(µ, L∞(ν)) is an allocation for EG if it satisfies:∫
T
f(t)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ ∈ C and f(t) ∈ X a.e. t ∈ T .
(ii) An element λ ∈ R(T,X) is a relaxed allocation for EGR if it satisfies:∫
T
∫
X
ıX(x)λ(t, dx)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ ∈ C.
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Denote by A(EG) the set of Gelfand integrable allocations for EG and by
A(EGR) the set of relaxed allocations for E
G
R.
Given a price pi ∈ ba(ν)\{0}, we can define (relaxed) budget set and (re-
laxed) demand set for each agent as in the previous section. Thus, (relaxed)
Walrasian equilibria with free disposal for EG (resp. EGR) are introduced in
an obvious way.
Definition 3.4. (i) A price-allocation pair (pi, f) ∈ (ba(ν) \ {0})×A(EG)
is a Walrasian equilibrium for EG if a.e. t ∈ T : f(t) ∈ B(t, pi) and
f(t)%(t) x for every x ∈ B(t, pi).
(ii) A price-relaxed allocation pair (pi, λ) ∈ (ba(ν) \ {0}) × A(EGR) is a
relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for EGR if a.e. t ∈ T : λ(t) ∈ BR(t, pi) and
λ(t)%R(t)P for every P ∈ BR(t, pi).
Denote by W(EG) the set of Walrasian allocations for EG and by W(EGR) the
set of relaxed Walrasian allocations for EGR.
It is clear now that Proposition 3.1 is valid for E = L∞(ν) andX ⊂ L∞(ν)
under Assumption 3.4. Corresponding to Proposition 3.2, we obtain the
following characterization under the saturation hypothesis, whose proof is
same with that of Proposition 3.2 if one simply replaces the Bochner integrals
by Gelfand ones.
Proposition 3.4. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a saturated finite measure space and (Ω,F , ν)
be a countably generated σ-finite measure space. Suppose that the economy
EG satisfies Assumption 3.4. If (pi, f) is a Walrasian equilibrium for EG, then
(pi, δf(·)) is a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for E
G
R. Conversely, if (pi, λ) is a
relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for EGR, then there exists a Walrasian equilib-
rium (pi, f) for EG such that λ(t)∼R(t) δf(t) a.e. t ∈ T whenever (T,Σ, µ) is
saturated.
Furthermore, under the same hypothesis with Proposition 3.4, the density
property in L∞(ν) is also valid for the Gelfand integral setting, i.e., A(EGR) =
A(EG)
w
and W(EGR) =W(E
G)
w
. The proof of this fact is same with that of
Proposition 3.3 if one simply replaces the Bochner integrals by Gelfand ones
invoking Proposition 2.2.
Next, we turn to the analogues of our substantive Theorems 3.1 on the
existence of (relaxed) Walrasian equilibria in large economies with free dis-
posal modeled on L∞(ν) as a commodity space. Since the norm interior
of the positive cone L∞+ (ν) of L
∞(ν) is nonempty, under the additional as-
sumption below, we can recover every result in Subsection 3.4 for the case
with E = L∞(ν) and E∗ = ba(ν) with the suitable replacement of the weak
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topology by the weak∗ topology and the Bochner integrals by the Gelfand
integrals.
Assumption 3.5. (i) X is a weakly∗ compact subset of L∞+ (ν).
(ii) For every t ∈ T there exists z(t) ∈ X such that ω(t)− z(t) belongs to
the norm interior of L∞+ (ν).
(iii) If x ∈ X is a satiation point for %(t), then x ≥ ω(t).
(iv) If x ∈ X is not a satiation point for %(t), then x belongs to the weak∗
closure of the upper contour set {y ∈ X | y≻(t) x}.
While the norm dual ba(ν) of L∞(ν) is larger than L1(ν), as emphasized
in Bewley (1972), the price systems in ba(ν) lack a reasonable economic
interpretation unless they belong to L1(ν) (i.e., they are countably additive);
see also Mas-Colell and Zame (1991). To derive positive equilibrium prices
with free disposal in L1(ν) for the relaxed economy from those in ba(ν), the
Yosida–Hewitt decomposition of finitely additive measures is crucial in our
framework, similar to Bewley (1972, 1991).
Theorem 3.3. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and (Ω,F , ν) be a
countably generated σ-finite measure space. Then for every economy EG sat-
isfying Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5:
(i) There exists a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for EGR
with a positive price in L1(ν).
(ii) There exists a Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal for EG with a
positive price in L1(ν) whenever (T,Σ, µ) is saturated.
The second assertion of Theorem 3.3 removes the convexity and mono-
tonicity of preferences from Bewley (1972, 1991) and introduces free dispos-
ability for Walrasian equilibria with the commodity space of L∞(ν).
4 Concluding Summary
In this paper we have presented three results as our contribution to the ex-
istence question of classical Walrasian general equilibrium with a continuum
of commodities and a finite or a continuum of agents. We have developed
these results through four propositions emphasizing “convexification by ran-
domization” as opposed to “convexification by aggregation”, and drawn on
relaxation techniques pioneered, and now pervasive, in optimal control the-
ory as well as in statistical decision-theory, and the theory of non-cooperative
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games. To be sure, the substantive power of these techniques lies in their be-
ing supplemented by a purification principle that eliminates randomization in
the testing of statistical hypothesis and in the replacement of mixed strate-
gies by their “equivalent” pure strategies in both non-atomic and atomic
game theory. All this being said, our thrust is squarely on classical Wal-
rasian general equilibrium theory as formulated by Aumann in 1964–1966.
It is this focus that leads us to ignore a possible third convexification pro-
cedure due to Hart–Hildenbrand–Kohlberg; see Hildenbrand (1974) and its
references. This approach involves a substantive shift from an anonymous
to a non-anonymous form for both games and economies, and a technical
shift from measurable functions to their induced distributions. It substi-
tutes a “symmetrization principle” for the purification principle. We leave a
consideration of this developing and rich literature for future work.
A Appendix 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Choose any P ∈ DR(t, p). Given the preference representation (3.2), if
P (D(t, p)) < 1, then∫
X
u(t, x)dP =
∫
D(t,p)
u(t, x)dP +
∫
X\D(t,p)
u(t, x)dP < max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y) (A.1)
because u(t, x) = maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y) for every x ∈ D(t, p) and u(t, x) <
maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y) for every x ∈ X \ D(t, p). On the other hand, for every
y ∈ B(t, p) we have∫
X
u(t, x)dP = max
Q∈BR(t,p)
∫
X
u(t, x)dQ ≥
∫
X
u(t, x)dδy = u(t, y)
in view of δy ∈ BR(t, p). Hence, we obtain a contradiction because of∫
u(t, x)dP ≥ maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y).
For the converse implication, suppose that P (D(t, p)) = 1. Since 〈p, x〉 ≤
〈p, ω(t)〉 for every x ∈ D(t, p), we have∫
X
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP =
∫
D(t,p)
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP ≤
∫
D(t,p)
〈p, ω(t)〉dP = 〈p, ω(t)〉.
Thus, if P does not belong to DR(t, p), then there exists Q ∈ BR(t, p) such
that
∫
u(t, x)dQ >
∫
u(t, x)dP . Note also that∫
X
u(t, x)dP =
∫
D(t,p)
u(t, x)dP =
∫
D(t,p)
max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y)dP = max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y).
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Furthermore, Q(D(t, p)) = 1 a.e. t ∈ T ; for otherwise, we have
∫
u(t, x)dQ <
maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y) as derived in (A.1), a contradiction. We thus obtain∫
X
u(t, x)dQ =
∫
D(t,p)
u(t, x)dQ =
∫
D(t,p)
max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y)dQ = max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y).
This is a contradiction to the initial hypothesis. Therefore, P ∈ DR(t, p).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Pick any Walrasian equilibrium (p, f) for E . If the price-relaxed alloca-
tion pair (p, δf(·)) is not a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for ER, then there
exists A ∈ Σ of positive measure such that for every t ∈ A there exists
P ∈ BR(t, p) with P ≻R(t) δf(t). Given the preference representation (3.2),
this means the inequality
∫
u(t, x)dP > u(t, f(t)) = maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y). We
then have P (D(t, p)) = 1 for every t ∈ A; for otherwise,
∫
u(t, x)dP <
maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y) for some t ∈ A, a contradiction. On the other hand, the
equalities ∫
X
u(t, x)dP =
∫
D(t,p)
u(t, x)dP = max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y)
for every t ∈ T yield a contradiction to the above inequality. Therefore,
(p, δf(·)) is a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for ER.
Take any relaxed Walrasian equilibrium (p, λ) for ER. Let gphB(·, p)
(resp. gphD(·, p)) be the graph of the multifunction B(·, p) : T ։ X (resp.
D(·, p) : T ։ X) and denote by Borel(E,w) the Borel σ-algebra generated
by the weak topology of E. Since
D(t, p) =
{
x ∈ X | u(t, x) = max
y∈B(t,p)
u(t, y)
}
with gphB(·, p) ∈ Σ⊗ Borel(E,w), the measurable maximum theorem (see
Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 3, p. 60)) guarantees that gphD(·, p) ∈ Σ⊗
Borel(E,w). By Proposition 3.1, we have λ(t)(D(t, p)) = 1 a.e. t ∈ T . It
follows from Proposition 2.1 that there exists f ∈M(T,X) ⊂ L1(µ,E) with
f(t) ∈ D(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T such that
∫
fdµ =
∫∫
ıXλ(t, dx)dµ. Therefore,
(p, f) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E . Since λ(t)(D(t, p)) = 1 a.e. t ∈ T by
Theorem 3.1, we have
∫
u(t, x)λ(t, dx) = maxy∈B(t,p) u(t, y) = u(t, f(t)) a.e.
t ∈ T . Therefore, λ(t)∼R(t) δf(t) a.e. t ∈ T .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let λ0 ∈ A(ER) be arbitrarily and N0 be its any neighborhood. By def-
inition of the weak topology, there exists u1, . . . , uk in C1(T × X, µ) such
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that |Iui(ν) − Iui(ν0)| < 1, i = 1, . . . , k implies ν ∈ N0. Define Φ : T ×
X → E × Rk in Proposition 2.1 by Φ = (ıX , u1, . . . , uk). Then there exists
f ∈ M(T,X) such that
∫∫
Φ(t, x)λ(t, dx)dµ =
∫
Φ(t, f(t))dµ. This means
that f ∈ L1(µ,E),
∫∫
ıX(x)λ(t, dx)dµ =
∫
fdµ, and Iui(ν0) = Iui(δf ) for
i = 1, . . . , k. Therefore, f ∈ A(E) and δf ∈ N0. Since the choice of λ0 and
N0 is arbitrary, A(E) is dense in A(ER). Next, let λ0 ∈ W(ER) be arbitrarily.
Since λ0 ∈ DR(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T for some p ∈ E∗ \ {0}, it follows from Proposi-
tion 3.1 that λ0(t)(D(t, p)) = 1 a.e. t ∈ T . Let U(t) ≡ D(t, p) in Proposition
2.1 and N0 be any neighborhood of λ0. Then as in the above there exists
f ∈ A(E) with f(t) ∈ D(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T such that Iui(ν0) = Iui(δf ) for
i = 1, . . . , k. Therefore, f ∈ W(E) and δf ∈ N0, and hence, W(E) is dense
in W(ER).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The set of normalized price functionals is given by S∗ = {p ∈ E∗+ | 〈p, v〉 = 1},
where v ∈ E+ is taken from the norm interior of E+. Then the Banach–
Alaoglu theorem guarantees that S∗ is weakly∗ compact; see Mas-Colell and
Zame (1991, p. 1859).
Lemma A.1. DR : T × S∗ ։ Π(X) is a compact, convex-valued multifunc-
tion with gphDR(·, p) ∈ Σ⊗ Borel(Π(X)) for every p ∈ S
∗.
Proof. The compactness and convexity ofDR(t, p) follows from the continuity
and affinity of the relaxed utility function P 7→
∫
u(t, x)dP in (3.2). Fix p ∈
S∗ arbitrarily and define θp : T × Π(X) → R by θp(t, P ) =
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP −
〈p, ω(t)〉. Then t 7→ θp(t, P ) is measurable for every P ∈ Π(X). Since x 7→
〈p, ıX(x)〉 is a bounded continuous function on X , the function P 7→ θp(t, P )
is continuous for every t ∈ T in view of the definition of the topology of weak
convergence of probability measures. Thus, θp is a Carathe´odory function,
and hence, it is jointly measurable. Denote by Borel(Π(X)) the Borel σ-
algebra of Π(X). We then have
gphBR(·, p) = {(t, P ) ∈ T × Π(X) | θp(t, P ) ≤ 0} ∈ Σ⊗ Borel(Π(X)).
For the sake notational simplicity, define u˜ : T × Π(X) → R by u˜(t, P ) =∫
u(t, x)dP . Then u˜ is a Carathe´odory function, and hence, it is jointly
measurable. Given the representation of the relaxed preferences in (3.2), we
have
DR(t, p) =
{
P ∈ BR(t, p) | u˜(t, P ) = max
Q∈BR(t,p)
u˜(t, Q)
}
.
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Hence, by the measurable maximum theorem (see Hildenbrand (1974, Propo-
sition 3, p. 60)), we have gphDR(·, p) ∈ Σ⊗ Borel(Π(X)).
A difficulty might arise in the derivation of the upper semicontinuity of
p 7→ DR(t, p) because of the failure of the joint continuity of the valuation
functional (p, P ) 7→
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP on S∗ × Π(X) whenever S∗ is endowed
with the weak∗ topology of E∗, which is analogous to the well-known fail-
ure of the joint continuity of the valuational functional (p, x) 7→ 〈p, x〉 on
S∗ ×E whenever E is endowed with the weak topology; e.g., see Mas-Colell
and Zame (1991). To overcome the difficulty of the upper semicontinuity of
DR(t, ·) : S∗ ։ Π(X), we “enlarge” the relaxed demand set by introducing
the multifunction Γ : T × S∗ ։ Π(X) defined by
Γ(t, p) = {P ∈ Π(X) | P %R(t)Q ∀Q ∈ BR(t, p)}
adapting the device used in Lee (2013); Podczeck (1997) to the relaxation
framework.9 By definition, DR(t, p) ⊂ Γ(t, p) for every (t, p) ∈ T × S∗.
Lemma A.2. Γ : T ×S∗ ։ Π(X) is a compact, convex-valued multifunction
with gphΓ(·, p) ∈ Σ⊗Borel(Π(X)) for every p ∈ S∗ such that p 7→ Γ(t, p) is
upper semicontinuous for the weak∗ topology of S∗ for every t ∈ T .
Proof. The fact that Γ has compact convex values is obvious. To show the
upper semicontinuity, fix t ∈ T arbitrarily and let {pα} be a net in S∗ with
pα → p weakly∗ and choose any Pα ∈ Γ(t, pα) for each α with Pα → P . We
need to show that P ∈ Γ(t, p). Suppose, to the contrary, that P 6∈ Γ(t, p).
Then there exists Q ∈ Π(X) such that Q≻R(t)P and
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dQ ≤
〈p, ω(t)〉. It follows from the continuity of %R(t) and Assumption 3.2(ii) that
Q is taken such that Q≻R(t)P and
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dQ < 〈p, ω(t)〉. Thus, for all
sufficiently large α, we have Q≻R(t)P and 〈pα,
∫
ıXdQ〉 =
∫
〈pα, ıX(x)〉dQ <
〈p, ω(t)〉, which contradicts the fact that Pα ∈ Γ(t, pα). Therefore, P ∈
Γ(t, p). Since
Γ(t, p) =
{
P ∈ Π(X) | u˜(t, P ) ≥ max
Q∈BR(t,p)
u˜(t, Q)
}
and the marginal function t 7→ maxQ∈BR(t,p) u˜(t, Q) is measurable by the
measurable maximum theorem, we have gphΓ(·, p) ∈ Σ ⊗ Borel(Π(X)) for
every p ∈ S∗.
9See also Khan and Yannelis (1991) for another technique to evade the difficulty of
joint continuity in the original economy.
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Lemma A.3. Define the multifunction IΓ : T × S∗ ։ E by
IΓ(t, p) =
{∫
X
ıX(x)dP | P ∈ Γ(t, p)
}
.
Then IΓ is a weakly compact, convex-valued multifunction such that its range
IΓ(T ×S∗) is bounded and p 7→ IΓ(t, p) is upper semicontinuous for the weak∗
topology of S∗ and the norm topology of E for every t ∈ T .
Proof. It follows from the weak compactness of X that supx∈X ‖x‖ ≤ a for
some a ≥ 0. Thus, supP∈Γ(t,p) ‖
∫
ıXdP‖ ≤ a for every (t, p) ∈ T×S∗. Hence,
IΓ(T × S∗) is bounded. Since Γ(t, p) is a convex subset of Π(X) by Lemma
A.2, the convexity of IΓ(t, p) is obvious. To show the weak compactness of
Γ(t, p), fix (t, p) ∈ T × S∗ arbitrarily and choose a net yα ∈ IΓ(t, p) for each
α. Then there exists Pα ∈ Γ(t, p) such that yα =
∫
ıXdPα for each α. Since
Γ(t, p) is compact by Lemma A.2, we can extract a subnet from {Pα} (which
we do not relabel) converging to P ∈ Γ(t, p). Hence, the barycenter
∫
ıXdP
belongs to IΓ(t, p). It follows from the definition of the topology of the weak
convergence of probability measures that for every x∗ ∈ E∗, we have
〈x∗, yα〉 =
∫
X
〈x∗, ıX(x)〉dPα →
∫
X
〈x∗, ıX(x)〉dP =
〈
x∗,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
because x 7→ 〈x∗, ıX(x)〉 is a bounded continuous function on X . This means
that yα →
∫
ıXdP weakly in E. Thus, IΓ(t, p) is weakly compact.
To show the upper semicontinuity, fix t ∈ T arbitrarily and let {pα}
be a net in S∗ with pα → p weakly∗ and choose any yα ∈ IΓ(t, pα) for
each α with yα → y strongly in E. We need to show that y ∈ IΓ(t, p).
Suppose, to the contrary, that y 6∈ IΓ(t, p). Then for each α there exists
Pα ∈ Γ(t, pα) such that yα =
∫
ıXdPα. Denote by coX be the closed convex
hull of X . Then the barycenters
∫
ıXdPα belong to coX ; see Diestel and
Uhl (1977, Corollary II.2.8). Hence, we have y ∈ coX . It follows from
Choquet’s theorem (see Phelps (2001, Proposition 1.2)) that there exists
P ∈ Π(X) such that 〈x∗, y〉 =
∫
〈x∗, ıX(x)〉dP = 〈x∗,
∫
ıXdP 〉 for every
x∗ ∈ E∗. This means that y =
∫
ıXdP . In view of y 6∈ IΓ(t, p), we have P 6∈
Γ(t, p). As demonstrated in the proof of Lemma A.2, there exists Q ∈ Π(X)
such that Q≻R(t)P and 〈pα,
∫
ıXdQ〉 =
∫
〈pα, ıX(x)〉dQ < 〈p, ω(t)〉 for all
sufficiently large α, which contradicts the fact that Pα ∈ Γ(t, pα). Therefore,
y ∈ IΓ(t, p).
What is significant in the next lemma is that the upper semicontinuity
of p 7→
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ is preserved under integration without any assumption
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on the finite measure space (T,Σ, µ) due to the fact that the upper semicon-
tinuous multifunction p 7→ IΓ(t, p) has weakly compact convex values. This
observation permits us to invoke fixed point theorems in the sequel.
Lemma A.4. The Bochner integral
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ of the multifunction IΓ(·, p) :
T ։ E is nonempty, weakly compact, and convex for every p ∈ S∗, and the
multifunction p 7→
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ is upper semicontinuous for the weak
∗ topology
of S∗ and the norm topology of E.
Proof. The nonemptiness and convexity of
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ are obvious because
for every p ∈ S∗ the Bochner integrable selectors of IΓ( ·, p) : T ։ E are
precisely of the form
∫
ıXλ(t, dx) ∈ IΓ(t, p) with λ(t) ∈ Γ(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T and
λ ∈ R(T,X). The weak compactness of
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ follows from Yannelis
(1991, Theorem 6.1).
To show the upper semicontinuity, introduce the support functional of
C ⊂ E and define s(·, C) : E∗ → R ∪ {+∞} by s(x∗, C) = supx∈C〈x
∗, x〉.
Then the weakly compact convex-valued multifunction p 7→
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ is
upper semicontinuous if and only if p 7→ s(x∗,
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ) is upper semicon-
tinuous for every x∗ ∈ E∗; see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.41).
Since s(x∗,
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ) =
∫
s(x∗, IΓ(t, p))dµ for every p ∈ S∗ (see Aubin and
Frankowska (1990, Proposition 8.6.2)), it suffices to show the upper semicon-
tinuity of p 7→
∫
s(x∗, IΓ(t, p))dµ for every x
∗ ∈ E∗. Since S∗ is metrizable
with respect to the weak∗ topology, we can resort to sequential convergence
in S∗. Let {pn} be a sequence in S∗ with pn → p weakly∗. Since the weak
compact convex valued multifunction p 7→ IΓ(t, p) is upper semicontinuous
for every t ∈ T by Lemma A.3, the function p 7→ s(x∗, IΓ(t, p)) is upper
semicontinuous for every x∗ ∈ E∗ and t ∈ T . Fix x∗ ∈ E∗ arbitrarily. Since
the sequence of functions t 7→ s(x∗, IΓ(t, pn)) is bounded, we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
∫
T
s(x∗, IΓ(t, pn))dµ ≤
∫
T
lim sup
n→∞
s(x∗, IΓ(t, pn))dµ
≤
∫
T
s(x∗, IΓ(t, p))dµ
where the first equality follows from Fatou’s lemma and the second inequality
exploits the upper semicontinuity of p 7→ s(x∗, IΓ(t, p)). Therefore, p 7→∫
s(x∗, IΓ(t, p))dµ is upper semicontinuous for every x
∗ ∈ E∗.
A maximal element in Π(X) for %R(t) is called a satiation point for
%R(t). Corresponding to the conditions (iii) and (iv) of Assumption 3.2 on
the original preferences, the condition on (non)satiation points for the relaxed
preferences takes the following form.
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Lemma A.5. (i) If P ∈ Π(X) is a satiation point for %R(t), then
∫
ıXdP
≥ ω(t).
(ii) If P ∈ Π(X) is not a satiation point for %R(t), then P belongs to the
closure of the upper contour set {Q ∈ Π(X) | Q≻R(t)P}.
Proof. (i): Let U(t) ⊂ X be the set of satiation points for %(t). Given the
preference representation (3.2), we have maxx∈X u(t, x) > u(t, y) for every
y ∈ X \ U(t). We first claim that P ∈ Π(X) is a satiation point for %R(t)
if and only if P (U(t)) = 1. Suppose that P is satiated for %R(t). We then
have
∫
u(t, x)dP ≥
∫
u(t, x)dQ for every Q ∈ Π(X). Assume that P (U(t)) <
1. If we choose Q ∈ Π(X) satisfying Q(U(t)) = 1, then
∫
u(t, x)dP <
maxx∈X u(t, x) =
∫
u(t, x)dQ, a contradiction. Conversely, if P (U(t)) =
1, then
∫
u(t, x)dP = maxx∈X u(t, x) ≥
∫
u(t, x)dQ for every Q ∈ Π(X).
Hence, P is a satiation point for %R(t). Since ıX(x) − ω(t) ≤ 0 for every
x ∈ U(t) in view of Assumption 3.2(iii), integrating this inequality over U(t)
with respect to any satiated P yields
∫
ıXdP − ω(t) ≤ 0.
(ii): Take any nonsatiation point P ∈ Π(X) for %(t). We need to show
that there exists a sequence {Pn} in Π(X) with Pn≻R(t)P for each n and
Pn → P . Since the convex hull of ∆(X) is dense in Π(X) (see Aliprantis and
Border (2006, Theorem 15.10)) and Π(X) is separable, P is approximated
arbitrarily by a sequence of the convex combinations of Dirac measures of
the form Q =
∑
i∈I α
iδxi ∈ Π(X), where x
i ∈ X , αi > 0, and
∑
i∈I αi = 1
with a finite index set I. Since P (U(t)) < 1, we may assume without loss
of generality that xi ∈ X \ U(t) for some i ∈ I whenever Q is close enough
to P . For each xi ∈ X \ U(t), choose a sequence yin ∈ X with y
i
n≻(t) x
i for
each n and yin → x
i weakly, which is possible by Assumption 3.2(iv). Define
the probability measure by
Pn =
∑
{i∈I|xi∈U(t)}
αiδxi +
∑
{i∈I|xi∈X\U(t)}
αiδyi
n
.
By construction, we have∫
X
u(t, x)dPn =
∑
{i∈I|xi∈U(t)}
αiu(t, xi) +
∑
{i∈I|xi∈X\U(t)}
αiu(t, yin)
>
∑
i∈I
αiu(t, xi) =
∫
X
u(t, x)dQ.
Hence, Pn≻R(t)Q for each n. Since Pn → Q and Q can be taken close
arbitrarily to P , we obtain the desired conclusion.
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Lemma A.6.
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP ≥ 〈p, ω(t)〉 for every (t, p) ∈ T × S∗ and P ∈
Γ(t, p).
Proof. If P is a satiation point for %R(t), then by Lemma A.5(i),
∫
ıXdP ≥
ω(t), and hence,
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP = 〈p,
∫
ıXdP 〉 ≥ 〈p, ω(t)〉 a.e. t ∈ T . If
P is not a satiation point %R(t) and
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP < 〈p, ω(t)〉, it follows
from Lemma A.5(ii) that there exists Q≻R(t)P such that
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉dQ <
〈p, ω(t)〉, which contradicts the fact that P ∈ Γ(t, p).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i): Define the multifunction ξ : S∗ ։ E by
ξ(p) =
∫
T
IΓ(t, p)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ.
Then by Lemma A.4, ξ is upper semicontinuous for the weak∗ topology of S∗
and the norm topology of E with weakly compact, convex values. We claim
that for every p ∈ S∗ there exists z ∈ ξ(p) such that 〈p, z〉 ≤ 0. To this end,
fix p ∈ S∗ arbitrarily. By Lemma A.1, there exists a measurable function
λp : T → Π(X) such that λp(t) ∈ DR(t, p) ⊂ Γ(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T . Since∫
ıXλp(t, dx) ∈ IΓ(t, p), we have
∫∫
ıXλp(t, dx)dµ ∈
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ. Integrating
the relaxed budget constraint
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉λp(t, dx)−〈p, ω(t)〉 ≤ 0 over T yields〈
p,
∫∫
ıXλp(t, dx)dµ−
∫
ωdµ
〉
≤ 0. Hence, the vector z =
∫∫
ıXλp(t, dx)dµ−∫
ωdµ ∈ ξ(p) satisfies 〈p, z〉 ≤ 0.
It follows from the infinite-dimensional version of the Gale–Nikaido Lemma
(see Yannelis (1985, Theorem 3.1)) that there exists p ∈ S∗ such that
ξ(p) ∩ (−E+) 6= ∅. Hence, there exists a measurable function λ : T → Π(X)
with λ(t) ∈ Γ(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T satisfying
∫∫
ıXλ(t, dx)dµ ∈
∫
IΓ(t, p)dµ and∫∫
ıXλ(t, dx)dµ−
∫
ωdµ ≤ 0. This means that λ ∈ A(ER) and∫
T
〈
p,
∫
X
ıX(x)λ(t, dx)
〉
dµ ≤
∫
T
〈p, ω(t)〉dµ.
On the other hand, by Lemma A.6,〈
p,
∫
X
ıX(x)λ(t, dx)
〉
≥ 〈p, ω(t)〉 a.e. t ∈ T .
Combining these inequalities yields the equality
∫
〈p, ıX(x)〉λ(t, dx) = 〈p, ω(t)〉
a.e. t ∈ T for the relaxed budget constraint. Note also that by construction
we have
DR(t, p) = Γ(t, p) ∩
{
P ∈ Π(X) |
∫
X
〈p, ıX(x)〉dP = 〈p, ω(t)〉
}
.
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This means that λ(t) belongs to DR(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T . Therefore, the price-
relaxed allocation pair (p, λ) ∈ S∗ ×R(T,X) is a relaxed Walrasian equilib-
rium for ER.
(ii): This follows from the assertion (i) and Proposition 3.2.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
(i): When X is a finite set, the difficulty of the joint continuity of the valu-
ation functional (p, x) 7→ 〈p, x〉 on S∗ ×X never arises because the relative
topology of X inherited from the weak topology of E is a discrete topology.
Indeed, let (pα, xα) be a net in S
∗ ×X converging to (p, x) ∈ S∗ ×X . Since
xα → x weakly means that xα = x for every α ≥ α0 with some α0, we have
limα〈pα, xα〉 = limα〈pα, x〉 = 〈p, x〉. Hence, the valuation functional is con-
tinuous on S∗×X for the weak∗ topology of E∗ and the weak topology of E.
This implies that the relaxed demand multifunction DR(t, ·) is upper semi-
continuous on S∗ for every t ∈ T . Let IDR : T × S
∗ → E be a multifunction
defined by
IDR(t, p) =
{∫
X
ıX(x)dP | P ∈ DR(t, p)
}
.
Replacing Γ by DR in the proof of Lemma A.4 yields that the Bochner
integral
∫
IDR(t, p)dµ is nonempty, weakly compact, and convex for every
p ∈ S∗, and the multifunction p 7→
∫
IDR(t, p)dµ is upper semicontinuous for
the weak∗ topology of S∗ and the norm topology of E.
Define the multifunction ξ : S∗ ։ E by
ξ(p) =
∫
T
IDR(t, p)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ.
Then ξ is upper semicontinuous for the weak∗ topology of S∗ and the norm
topology of E with weakly compact, convex values. As in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.1, for every p ∈ S∗ there exists z ∈ ξ(p) such that 〈p, z〉 ≤ 0. It
follows from the infinite-dimensional version of the Gale–Nikaido Lemma
(see Yannelis (1985, Theorem 3.1)) that there exists p ∈ S∗ such that
ξ(p) ∩ (−E+) 6= ∅. Hence, there exists a measurable function λ : T → Π(X)
with λ(t) ∈ DR(t, p) a.e. t ∈ T satisfying
∫∫
ıXλ(t, dx)dµ ∈
∫
IDR(t, p)dµ and∫∫
ıXλ(t, dx)dµ −
∫
ωdµ ≤ 0. This means that the price-relaxed allocation
pair (p, λ) ∈ S∗ ×R(T,X) is a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium for ER.
(ii): This follows from the assertion (i) and Proposition 3.2.
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B Appendix 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Given the duality L∞(ν)∗ = ba(ν), denote by σ(ba, L∞) the weak∗ topology of
ba(ν). Define the normalized price space by S∗ = {pi ∈ ba+(ν) | 〈pi, ψ〉 = 1},
where ψ is taken from the norm interior of L∞+ (ν). Then S
∗ is σ(ba, L∞)-
compact (i.e., weakly∗ compact) and convex.
Lemma B.1. There exists a sequence {ϕn} in L1(ν) such that ba(ν) =
{ϕn}
σ(ba ,L∞)
.
Proof. Consider the natural embedding L1(ν) ⊂ L1(ν)∗∗ = ba(ν) and note
that L1(ν) is σ(ba, L∞)-dense subset of ba(ν); see Dunford and Schwartz
(1958, Corollary V.4.6). Since L1(ν) is separable in view of the countable
generation of F , there exists a countable dense set {ϕn} of L1(ν) with respect
to the norm topology. Since L1(ν) = {ϕn}
‖·‖
⊂ {ϕn}
σ(ba ,L∞)
, where {ϕn}
‖·‖
is the norm closure of {ϕn} in L1(ν) and {ϕn}
σ(ba ,L∞)
is the weak∗ closure
of {ϕn} in ba(ν), we have ba(ν) = L1(ν)
σ(ba ,L∞)
⊂ {ϕn}
σ(ba ,L∞)
. Hence,
ba(ν) = {ϕn}
σ(ba ,L∞)
.
Given the technique explored in Subsection A.4, the existence of equi-
librium prices in ba+(ν) is more or less routine because it is again a direct
application of the Gale–Nikaido lemma in L∞(ν). A key result is Theorem
B.1 below, for which we outline the proof.
Observation B.1. Lemma A.1 holds as it stands for E = L∞(ν) and X ⊂
L∞+ (ν).
Observation B.2. To see the validity of Lemma A.2, it suffices to show that
〈pi,
∫
ıXdP 〉 =
∫
X
〈pi, ıX(x)〉dP for every P ∈ Π(X) and pi ∈ ba(ν), where∫
ıXdP ∈ L∞(ν) is the Gelfand integral of ıX with respect to P . By Lemma
B.1, for every pi ∈ ba(ν) there exists a sequence ϕn ∈ L1(ν) such that ϕn → pi
for σ(ba, L∞)-topology. We then have 〈ϕn,
∫
ıXdP 〉 =
∫
〈ϕn, ıX(x)〉dP for
each n. Taking the limit in the both side of this equality yields〈
pi,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
= lim
n→∞
〈
ϕn,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
= lim
n→∞
∫
X
〈ϕn, ıX(x)〉dP
=
∫
X
lim
n→∞
〈ϕn, ıX(x)〉dP =
∫
X
〈pi, ıX(x)〉dP
where the third equality in the above employs the Lebesgue dominated con-
vergence theorem in view of the boundedness of X ⊂ L∞+ (ν).
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Now Lemma A.3 takes the following form.
Lemma B.2. Define the multifunction IΓ : T × S∗ ։ L∞(ν) by
IΓ(t, pi) =
{∫
X
ıX(x)dP | P ∈ Γ(t, pi)
}
.
Then IΓ is a weakly
∗ compact, convex-valued multifunction such that its range
IΓ(T×S∗) is bounded and pi 7→ IΓ(t, pi) is upper semicontinuous for the weak∗
topology of S∗ and the norm topology of L∞(ν) for every t ∈ T .
Proof. It follows from the weak∗ compactness of X that supx∈X ‖x‖ ≤ a for
some a ≥ 0. Thus, supP∈Γ(t,pi) ‖
∫
ıXdP‖ ≤ a for every (t, pi) ∈ T × S∗.
Hence, IΓ(T × S∗) is bounded, and hence, it is weakly∗ relatively compact.
Since Γ(t, pi) is a convex subset of Π(X) by Lemma A.2, the convexity of
IΓ(t, pi) is obvious. To show the weak
∗ compactness of Γ(t, pi), it suffices to
show that Γ(t, pi) is weakly∗ closed. To this end, fix (t, pi) ∈ T ×S∗ arbitrarily
and choose a net ψα ∈ IΓ(t, pi) for each α. Then there exists Pα ∈ Γ(t, pi)
such that ψα =
∫
ıXdPα for each α. Since Γ(t, pi) is compact by Lemma A.2,
we can extract a subnet from {Pα} (which we do not relabel) converging to
P ∈ Γ(t, pi). Hence, the barycenter
∫
ıXdP belongs to IΓ(t, pi). It follows
from the definition of the topology of the weak convergence of probability
measures that for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν), we have
〈ϕ, ψα〉 =
∫
X
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dPα →
∫
X
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP =
〈
ϕ,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
because x 7→ 〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉 is a bounded continuous function on X . This means
that ψα →
∫
ıXdP weakly
∗ in L∞(ν). Thus, IΓ(t, p) is weakly
∗ closed.
To show the upper semicontinuity, fix t ∈ T arbitrarily and let {piα} be
a net in S∗ with piα → pi weakly
∗ and choose any ψα ∈ IΓ(t, piα) for each
α with ψα → ψ strongly in L∞(ν). We need to show that ψ ∈ IΓ(t, pi).
Suppose, to the contrary, that ψ 6∈ IΓ(t, pi). Then for each α there exists
Pα ∈ Γ(t, piα) such that ψα =
∫
ıXdPα. Denote by co
w∗X be the weakly∗
closed convex hull of X . Then the barycenters
∫
ıXdPα belong to co
w
∗
X ;
see Sagara (2016, Lemma 3.1) and Khan and Sagara (2014, Lemma 2.1).
Hence, we have ψ ∈ cow
∗
X . It follows from Choquet’s theorem (see Phelps
(2001, Proposition 1.2)) that there exists P ∈ Π(X) such that 〈ϕ, ψ〉 =∫
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP = 〈ϕ,
∫
ıXdP 〉 for every ϕ ∈ L
1(ν). This means that ψ =∫
ıXdP . In view of ψ 6∈ IΓ(t, pi), we have P 6∈ Γ(t, pi). As demonstrated in
the proof of Lemma A.2, there exists Q ∈ Π(X) such that Q≻R(t)P and
〈piα,
∫
ıXdQ〉 =
∫
〈piα, ıX(x)〉dQ < 〈pi, ω(t)〉 for all sufficiently large α, which
contradicts the fact that Pα ∈ Γ(t, piα). Therefore, ψ ∈ IΓ(t, pi).
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Corresponding to Lemma A.4, we obtain the following.
Lemma B.3. The Gelfand integral
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ of the multifunction IΓ :
T ×S∗ ։ L∞(ν) is nonempty, weakly∗ compact, and convex for every pi ∈ S∗,
and the multifunction pi 7→
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ is upper semicontinuous for the weak
∗
topology of S∗ and the norm topology of L∞(ν).
Proof. The nonemptiness and convexity of
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ are obvious because
for every pi ∈ S∗ the Gelfand integrable selectors of IΓ( ·, pi) : T ։ L∞(ν)
are precisely of the form
∫
ıXλ(t, dx) ∈ IΓ(t, pi) with λ(t) ∈ Γ(t, pi) a.e. t ∈ T
and λ ∈ R(T,X).
To show the weak∗ compactness of
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ, introduce the support
functional of C ⊂ L∞(ν) and define s(·, C) : L1(ν)→ R∪{+∞} by s(ϕ,C) =
supψ∈C〈ϕ, ψ〉. Since t 7→ IΓ(t, pi) is an integrably bounded multifunction
with weakly∗ compact, convex values by Lemma B.2, it suffices to show that
t 7→ IΓ(t, pi) is weakly∗ scalarly measurable in the sense that t 7→ s(ϕ, IΓ(t, pi))
is measurable for every ψ ∈ L1(ν); see Khan (1985, Claim 2 to the proof of
Theorem 2) or Cascales et al. (2011, Proposition 2.3(i) and Theorem 4.5). To
this end, it suffices to show that t 7→ supP∈Γ(t,pi)
∫
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP is measurable
for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν) because
s(ϕ, IΓ(t, pi)) = sup
P∈Γ(t,pi)
〈
ϕ,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
= sup
P∈Γ(t,pi)
∫
X
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP
in view of the Gelfand integrability of ıX . Since gphΓ(·, pi) ∈ Σ⊗Borel(Π(X))
by Lemma A.2 and P 7→
∫
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP is continuous because x 7→ 〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉
is a bounded continuous function on X , it follows from the measurable max-
imum theorem that the marginal function t 7→ supP∈Γ(t,pi)
∫
〈ϕ, ıX(x)〉dP is
measurable.
The weakly∗ compact convex-valued multifunction pi 7→
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ is
upper semicontinuous if and only if pi 7→ s(ϕ,
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ) is upper semi-
continuous for every ϕ ∈ L1(ν); see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem
17.41). Since s(ϕ,
∫
IΓ(t, pi)dµ) =
∫
s(ϕ, IΓ(t, pi))dµ for every pi ∈ S∗ (see
Cascales et al. (2011, Proposition 2.3(i) and Theorem 4.5)), it suffices to
show the upper semicontinuity of pi 7→
∫
s(ϕ, IΓ(t, pi))dµ for every ϕ ∈ L
1(ν).
The rest of the proof is same with the proof of Lemma A.4.
Observation B.3. Lemma A.5 holds as it stands. Lemma A.6 holds by the
same reason with Observation B.1.
An analogue of the first assertion of Theorem 3.1 with the commodity
space of L∞(ν) with the Gelfand integral setting is provided as follows.
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Theorem B.1. Let (T,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space and (Ω,F , ν) be a
countably generated σ-finite measure space. Then for every economy EG sat-
isfying Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5, there exists a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium
with free disposal for EGR with a positive price.
Proof. Define the multifunction ξ : S∗ ։ L∞(ν) by
ξ(pi) =
∫
T
IΓ(t, pi)dµ−
∫
T
ω(t)dµ.
Then by Lemma B.3, ξ is upper semicontinuous for the weak∗ topology of S∗
and the norm topology of L∞(ν) with weakly∗ compact, convex values. As in
the proof of Theorem 3.1(i), we can show that for every pi ∈ S∗ there exists
z ∈ ξ(pi) such that 〈pi, z〉 ≤ 0. Hence, it follows from the infinite-dimensional
version of the Gale–Nikaido Lemma (see Yannelis (1985, Theorem 3.1)) that
there exists pi ∈ S∗ such that ξ(pi) ∩ (−L∞+ (ν)) 6= ∅. The rest of the proof is
same with the proof of Theorem 3.1(i) with replacing the Bochner integrals
by Gelfand ones and the use of Lemma A.6 with Observation B.3
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (i): Let (pi, λ) ∈ ba+(ν) × A(EGR) be a relaxed Wal-
rasian equilibrium with free disposal for EGR assured in Theorem B.1. By
the Yosida–Hewitt decomposition of finitely additive measures (see Yosida
and Hewitt (1952, Theorems 1.22 and 1.24)), pi is decomposed uniquely into
pi = pi1 + pi2, where pi1 ≥ 0 is countably additive and pi2 ≥ 0 is purely finitely
additive. (Here, pi2 is purely finitely additive if every countably additive mea-
sure pi′ on F satisfying 0 ≤ pi′ ≤ pi2 is identically zero.) Furthermore, there
exists a sequence {Ωn} in F such that (a) Ωn ⊂ Ωn+1 for each n = 1, 2, . . . ;
(b) limn pi1(Ω \ Ωn) = 0; (c) pi2(Ωn) = 0 for each n = 1, 2, . . . .
We claim that (pi1, λ) a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium with free disposal
for EGR. To this end, suppose that P ≻R(t) λ(t). We need to demonstrate
that
∫
〈pi1, ıX(x)dP 〉 > 〈pi1, ω(t)〉. It follows from the definition of relaxed
Walrasian equilibria that
∫
〈pi, ıX(x)dP 〉 > 〈pi, ω(t)〉. Define Xn = {ψ ∈
X | ψ(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ Ω \ Ωn}. Then Xn ⊂ Xn+1 for each n by virtue of
condition (a) and P (
⋃
Xn) = P (X) = 1. Without loss of generality we
may assume that P (Xn) > 0 for each n. Let Pn ∈ Π(X) be the conditional
probability measure of Xn defined by Pn(Z) = P (Z ∩Xn)/P (Xn) with Z ∈
Borel(X,w ∗), where the relevant Borel σ-algebra of X ⊂ L∞(ν) is with
respect to the weak∗ topology of L∞(ν). By construction, Pn(Xn) = 1 for
each n. Since each Pn is absolutely continuous with respect to P , there is a
Radon–Nikodym derivative wn ∈ L1(P ) of Pn. Since Pn(Z)→ P (Z) for every
Z ∈ Borel(X,w ∗) by condition (b), it is easy to see that wn → χX strongly in
L1(P ). Choose any continuous function v on X . It follows from the Lebesgue
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dominated convergence theorem that
∫
vdPn =
∫
vwndP →
∫
vdP , and
hence, Pn → P in Π(X). By the continuity of %R(t), we have Pn≻R(t) λ(t)
and
∫
〈pi, ı(x)〉dPn > 〈pi, ω(t)〉 for all sufficiently large n. Since Xn is closed
and convex, and Pn(Xn) = 1, we have
∫
ıXdPn ∈ Xn by Sagara (2016,
Lemma 3.1). Let ψn :=
∫
ıXdPn. Since 〈pi2, ψn〉 =
∫
ψndpi2 =
∫
Ωn
ψndpi2 = 0
by condition (c), we have 〈pi, ψn〉 = 〈pi1, ψn〉+ 〈pi2, ψn〉 = 〈pi1, ψn〉. In view of∫
ıXdP ≥
∫
ıXdPn, we obtain∫
X
〈pi1, ıX(x)〉dP =
〈
pi1,
∫
X
ıX(x)dP
〉
≥ 〈pi1, ψn〉 = 〈pi, ψn〉 > 〈pi, ω(t)〉
≥ 〈pi1, ω(t)〉
as desired. This also implies that pi1 6= 0. Since pi is absolutely continuous
with respect to ν, the Radon Nikodym derivative of pi1 is an equilibrium price
in L1(ν).
(ii): This follows from the assertion (i) and Proposition 3.4.
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